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"SIMPLE LOGIC": RACE, THE IDENTITY




Des "mythes nationaux" permettent aux membres d'une nation de se consid6rer
comme membres d'une communaut6. Le "mythe national" du Canada se repose
grandement sur l'id6e que les peuples d'origine europ6enne sont les "premiers ci-
toyens" du pays et qu'on doit A ces derniers une grande part de son d6veloppement.
Jouant ce r6le de premier citoyen dans une histoire qui exige le reniement des peuples
autochtones et des peuples de couleur, qui ont 6galement contribu6 A la construction
du pays, les Canadiens d'origine europ6enne en sont venus A repr6senter l'id6e de
citoyen. Cette "histoire officielle" est de toute 6vidence une histoire raciale, repr6sen-
tant les Canadiens d' origine europ6enne comme ayant droit aux fruits de la citoyennet6,
tandis que tous les autres sont consid6r~s comme "ext6rieurs" A la nation. Dans cet article
qui 6tudie la rh6torique et le discours politiques relativement aux r6fugi6s "sans
papiers", l'auteure retrace le mythe national sous-tendant la r6forme de l'immigration
et, plus particuliirement, les r6formes limitant les droits des r6fugi6s ayant obtenu le
droit d'asile. L'auteure analyse l'appui politique accord6 aux dispositions portant sur
les pieces d'identit6 d'abord pr6sent6es dans le projet de loi C-86, puis dans la cr6ation
en 1996 de la cat6gorie des r6fugi6s au sens de la Convention se trouvant au Canada
sans pi~ces d'identit6 (RCCSPI). Ces dispositions, qui ont nui notamment aux Cana-
diens d'origine somalienne, demeurent en vigueur malgr6 leur manque de logique et
leur inconstimtionnalit6 apparents. L'auteure avance que les arguments propos6s pour
appuyer les dispositions portant sur l'identit6 reposent sur le mythe national de Cana-
diens blancs assi6g6s et trahis par des gens de couleur qui veulent simplement obtenir
ce que les blancs poss~dent.
Sherene Razack is professor of sociology and equity studies in education, the Ontario Institute for
Studies in Education, University of Toronto. Her most recent book is Looking white people in the
eye: gender race and culture in courtrooms and classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1998 & 1999). The author deeply appreciates the research assistance and critical feedback of Sheila
Gill, Donna Jeffery, Teresa Macias and especially Leslie Thielen Wilson. Their thoroughness and
insight made this article stronger than it might otherwise be.
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Simple logic dictates that Canada should protect itself against
any Tom, Dick or Harry wanting to enter the country - and you
realise that some of these people are false claimants, don't you?
Fernand Jourdenais, (Progressive Conservative) Member of
Parliament (1992) 1
Because they have no ID, we will not grant these people
permanent resident status until they have had time to
demonstrate respect for the laws of Canada and for us to detect
those who may be guilty of crimes against humanity or acts of
terrorism ... The message is clear -fraud will not be tolerated.
Lucienne Robillard, (Liberal) Minister of Employment and
Immigration (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1996)2
INTRODUCTION
National stories, narratives or narrations enable members of nations to think of
themselves as part of a community. Stories make it possible for individuals who are
unknown to each other to imagine that they share a common bond. It is in this sense
that Benedict Anderson writes that nations are imagined. 3 However, national stories,
including a story about the nation's origins and its history told over time, are contested
stories. As Edward Said reminds us, in imperialism, where the battle is over land ("who
owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won
it back, and who now plans its future"), national narratives are those of the dominant
group: "The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging,
is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connec-
tions between them."'4 As a white settler society founded on the basis of the theft of
Aboriginal lands, the Canadian national story, told in the nation's literature, artistic
and cultural production, as well as in its parliaments, newspapers and educational
institutions, has largely rested on the idea that peoples of European origin are the
country's original citizens and the ones who are largely responsible for its develop-
ment.5 Cast as the "original" citizens in a story requiring the disavowal of both
1. Legislative Committee of the House of Commons on Bill C-86, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 3rd
Sess., 34 th Pad., 1991-1992, at 4:25 [hereinafter Minutes and cited by issue]. Note that the dates of the
issues are as follows: Issue 1, Tuesday June 23, 1992; Issue 2, 27 July 27 1992; Issue 3, 28 July 1992;
Issue 4, 29 July 29 1992; Issue 5, 30 July 1992; Issue 6, 10 August 1992; Issue 7, 11 August 1992; Issue
8, 12 August 1992; Issue 9, 13 August 1992; Issue 10, 15 September 1992; Issue 11, 16 September 1992;
Issue 12, 17 September 1992; Issue 13, 29 October 1992; Issue 14, 30 October 1992; Issue 15, 3
November 1992; Issue 16,4 November 1992; Issue 17,4 November 1992; Issue 18, 5 November 1992.
2. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release 96/27 "Minister Robillard Announces Measures
for Refugees Lacking ID to Become Permanent Residents" (13 November 1996).
3. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London & New York: Verso Press, 1983).
4. E. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc, 1993) at xiii.
5. D. Stasiulus & R. Jhappan, "The Fractious Politics of a Settler Society: Canada" in D. Stasiulus &
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Aboriginal peoples and peoples of colour whose labour also built the country, Euro-
pean Canadians come to represent the idea of the citizen. This official story is
manifestly a racial story, producing European Canadians as entitled to the fruits of
citizenship, and all others as external to the nation. In this article examining political
rhetoric, 6 and discourse, 7 I trace the national story that underpins immigration reform;
specifically, I turn to reforms limiting the rights of refugees granted asylum. I suggest
that the national story remains a racial story and that one sees its deployment by
political elites in the creation of an unequal structure of citizenship.
The racial story of the 1990s is a simple one. Canada is besieged. Every Tom, Dick
and Harry wants to get in. They will stop at nothing. They do not respect us. They will
return our generosity with betrayal. We have no choice but to become strict and to
monitor more closely who is coming in. This is "simple logic", a national story told
to justify tighter border controls in the 1990s. Driven by the story, Canada, like so
many other Western nations, embarked on a series of immigration reforms intended
not only to tightly regulate who could get in but who was entitled to the full benefits
of citizenship. Identity documents became a useful tool in this project of nation
building. Beginning with Bill C-86 (amending the Immigration Act), introduced into
the House of Commons under a Conservative government in June 1992 and passed
Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulation of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and
Class (London: Sage Publications, 1995) 95 at 97. Examples of the national story as told in art and
novels held up as quintessentially Canadian include the paintings of Emily Carr, in which Aboriginal
culture appears as dead or dying, and the novels of Margaret Atwood. In the latter, Roy Mikki writes,
"an Anglocentric history with Canada as victim of American imperialism" prevails. "The privileging
of the author's own subject position as 'English Canadian' reader, in effect, banished 'racialized'
Canadians from public space, a gesture that denied them identity in her text of nationhood." R.
Mikki, Broken Entries: Race, Subjectivity, Writing (Toronto: The Mercury Press, 1998) at 101.
6. I use the term "rhetoric" here in a common sense way to describe language that is "inflected by
partisan agendas and desires". I am aware, however, and as Stanley Fish points out about those who
use the term, that I imply that there are two kinds of language: rhetoric, a language "that manipulates
reality" and "language that faithfully reports on matters of fact". The notion of an unbiased language
that will enable us to speak the truth contradicts, however, the idea that I also rely upon, that nations
are constructed symbolically in language and that all language constitutes rather than reflects reality
(see note 7). In using the term "rhetoric", I am drawing attention to the constructions (the "undocu-
mented", the "original citizen" and so on) that are produced by the political language I examine. S.
Fish, "Rhetoric" in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin, eds., Critical Terms for Literary Study (Chicago
& London: University of Chicago Press, 1990 & 1995) 203 at 205.
7. There are two meanings of discourse, one linguistic and one based on the work of Michel Foucault.
In its linguistic meaning, for example in the work of Teun van Dijk upon whom I rely in my analysis of
political speech, discourse refers to "text and talk: syntactic forms, lexical style, rhetorical operations, text
schemata, and conversational strategies". T. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism (Newbury Park,
California: Sage Publications, 1993) at 29. In its Foucauldian poststructuralist sense, which I rely upon
when I use concepts such as story, narrative or fantasy, the meaning of discourse, as Paul Bov6 writes, is
"the organized and regulated, as well as the regulating and constituting, functions of language that it
studies: its aim is to describe the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, intellectuals,
the control of populations, and the modem state as these intersect in the functions of systems of thought."
P. Bov , "Discourse" in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin, eds. Critical Terms for Literary Study (Chicago
& London: University of Chicago Press, 1990 & 1995) 50 at 54-55.
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into law six months later, and continuing with the creation of the Undocumented
Convention Refugee in Canada Class in 1997 under a Liberal government, Canada
joined other western nations in the creation of a class of people neatly labelled the
"undocumented", people marked as less deserving of juridical and social rights by
virtue of their lack of passports or travel documents.
Under the amendments to the Immigration Act8 introduced in Bill C-86,9 a refugee
who arrives at the border without appropriate identity documents has a greater burden
of proving that he or she is a Convention Refugee, a condition of obtaining asylum.
Once granted asylum, under s. 46.04(8) of the Immigration Act she then does not have
the right that other refugees have to apply for permanent resident status.' 0 The
anomalous situation arises that a refugee can satisfy one arm of the Department of
Immigration, the Immigration and Refugee Board, that she is a legitimate asylum
seeker in need of protection (in spite of the heavier burden of proof), and still not win the
approval of another arm to become a permanent resident of Canada. Convention Refugees
caught in what is almost literally a no man's land (most of the refugees caught in this way
are women and children) between asylum and permanent resident status are mostly of
Somali origin. By most accounts, there are 13,000 persons in this state of legal limbo
where they possess only some of the rights and benefits of citizenship."I
As the decade of the nineties wore on, the full impact of s. 46.04(8) began to be felt.
Without permanent resident status, Somali Canadians could not sponsor dependants
outside Canada (in some cases this meant that children left behind in refugee camps
could not be reunited with their parents) or leave its borders. Treated as foreign
nationals, they paid higher university fees, and encountered a number of credit and
employment roadblocks owing to their irregular citizenship status. 12 Under pressure
by refugee advocates and communities to do something, the federal government (now
Liberal) responded late in 1996 with the proposal of a special class of Convention
Refugee who could be landed without fulfilling the identity document requirement.
The class, known as the Undocumented Convention Refugee in Canada Class [here-
inafter UCRCC], applies only to those citizens of countries listed in Schedule XII of
the Immigration Regulations.13 Currently, only Somalia and Afghanistan are listed.
8. Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2.
9. Bill C-86, An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof. 3 rd Sess.,
34th Parl., 1991-92 (ISt reading 16 June 1992).
10. S. 46.04(8) states as follows: "An Immigration officer shall not grant landing either to an applicant
under subsection (1) or to any dependant of the applicant until the applicant is in possession of a
valid and subsisting passport or travel document or a satisfactory identity document."
11. A. Brouwer, What's In a Name? Identity Documents and Convention Refugees (Ottawa: Caledon
Institute for Social Policy, 1999), online: <http'//www.maytee.conpubtications-name.html>; J. Dryer,
"The Undocumented Convention Refugees in Canada Class: Creating a Refugee Underclass" (1998)
13 J.L. & Soc'! Po'y at 167.
12. Amended Amended Statement of Claim in Hussein Jama Aden et aL. and Her Majesty the Queen,
Court File No. IMM500/501-96 (F.C.T.D.).
13. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Regulations Amending the Immigration Regulations 1978,
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Persons without satisfactory identity documents from these two countries became
eligible for membership in this class, and thus for landing, five years from the date he
or she was granted asylum. While a five-year wait for permanent resident status seems
preferable to legal limbo, the UCRCC nonetheless further entrenches the idea first
given legal expression in Bill C-86, that Convention Refugees without identity
documents remain socially suspect and entitled to fewer rights in law than other
Convention Refugees. In December 1999 the current Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, Elinor Caplan, announced that the five year waitiing period would be
reduced to three years. 14 However, observers have continued to point out the conse-
quences of delayed landing for Somalis (three years is a long time to wait for family
reunification) and to note that one year after the UCRCC regulation, only 748
Convention Refugees were landed under the new regulation. 15
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these identity documents provisions is that
very few people have trouble seeing either their illogic or their discriminatory impact.
It is relatively easy, for instance, to see how tenuous the relationship is between the
objectives of such provisions (to catch criminals) and the demand for proper identity
documents. The possession of proper identity documents may reflect nothing more
than the power and resources of an individual able to procure them. Refugees are
seldom able to procure official documents without considerable risk and those who
flee states whose bureaucracies have collapsed have very limited options in this regard.
However, over the past decade, these obvious shortcomings have not led to the demise
of the identity provision and they are currently the subject of a constitutional challenge. 16
The plaintiffs allege that the identity provision, s. 46.04(8) of the Immigration Act,
has the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin, contrary to s. 15 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argue that since Somali nationals are unable
to obtain existing documents from Somalia owing to the collapse of that country's
bureaucracy, their inability to satisfy the. requirement arises because of their country
of origin. The subsection thus creates a distinction between Somalis and other
Convention Refugees. Further, the UCRCC does not fully remove the penalty.' 7
In this article, I explore why the identity document provisions have continued to stand
and why they may even survive a constitutional challenge in spite of the compelling
legal arguments against them. In effect I explore what gives vitality to laws that are
so evidently discriminatory. In different ways, both Conservative and Liberal govern-
ments have remained faithful to "simple logic" and to the penalizing of Convention
Refugees who do not possess "suitable" documents, although it is clear that Conser-
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement" (16 November 1996) Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 130, No. 46.
14. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Fact Sheet for Undocumented Convention Refugee In Canada Class
(UCRCC)" (30 December 1999), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <httpJ/www.cic.gc.cal
english/refugee/ucrcc-e.html> (date accessed: 3 March 2000).
15. Brouwer, supra note 11 at 11.
16. Supra note 12.
17. Ibid. at 9, para. 58.
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vative regimes are more attached to such policies than are Liberal ones. It seems
fruitless, then, to search for an explanation in political ideology per se. Clearly, the
story that Conservative and Liberal political elites tell around the identity provisions
strikes deep chords in the Canadian psyche, as these politicians well know. That is to
say, it is a story that makes sense to the public even when the facts speak otherwise.
It possesses an internal coherence that is not undermined by the many counter-argu-
ments that are offered.
With the objective in mind of tracing the internal coherence of the storyline of identity
documents - why it makes sense to lawmakers and indeed to many Canadians - I
propose to explore political discussions of the identity documents provisions in 1991
and in 1996. First I examine the hearings of the legislative committee which examined
Bill C-86 in 1991-92, one of the first occasions for an intensive public discussion over
identity provisions and a rich source for the tracing of the structures of parliamentary
thinking. I then follow the story through to 1996 when the same committee, now under
the Liberals, conducted hearings on the UCRCC regulations. I argue that "simple
logic" as it is talked about in these discussions relies for its coherence on a national
story of a Canada besieged and betrayed by bodies of colour. "Proper" identity
documents become defensible in this vision of Canada as a way of separating the
deserving from the undeserving and as a way of dealing with the inevitable duplicity
of people of colour. The storyline is hard to pin down as one that is explicitly about
race because its racist structure is not overt. Instead, "Canada besieged and betrayed"
is told as a story about a sovereign nation, overwhelmed by the large numbers of
refugees coming to its borders, refugees attracted by rumours of Canadian generosity.
Immigration scholars often accept this story and speak of the "grapevine" that enables
asylum seekers to learn of Canadian affluence and sends them flocking to our
borders. 18 Underpinned by the image of crowds at the border who simply want what
we have, the story of a nation besieged and betrayed is, I contend, a modern version
of an old racist narrative. When refugee analysts report that the number of claimants
jumped dramatically from 400 a year in the late 1970s to 5,200 annually between 1982
and 1984, and confirm that the numbers are increasing even more in the 1990s,19 the
threat posed by hordes of colQur seems self-evident; the increases over the last two
decades would seem to support the contention that Canada is indeed besieged. It
becomes hard to discern the racial ideas that animate the reporting of the increases,
ideas about the "original" citizens of Canada whose superior civilization so attracts
the "crowds" of colour at the border. Faced with the numbers only, it is also difficult
to see that the increases may not in fact represent a siege but a necessary flow of labour
to a country that deeply relies upon it.
18. F. Hawkins, "The Asylum Seekers" (1994-5) 52:2 Behind the Headlines 1 at 1; N. Kelley & M.
Trebilcock, Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1998) at 412.
19. Kelley & Trebilcock, Ibid.
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I suggest that white citizens come to believe that they are overrun, and that their
generosity is being abused because of the underlying notion that the crowds at the
border are simply greedy Third World peoples out to take advantage of unsuspecting
white Canadians who are entitled to live in a calm, ordered space. White citizens also
come to believe that as the "original" inhabitants, they are both obliged and entitled
to discipline the non-white Others who come to their borders. The relationship
between white citizens and refugees is deeply colonial and is revealed in the unself-
conscious talk about teaching refugees to be truthful and to learn respect. Non-white
citizens sometimes come to share in these beliefs too, understanding their own
presence in the country as more legitimate in comparison to those seeking entry now.
Without the racial component, the story of siege and betrayal and the stern measures
required to protect the "original" citizens would be less than convincing. The national
story works because it is able to draw upon colonial notions of a superior white
civilization encountering the barbarism of (in this case) Africa and (in an earlier time)
Aboriginal peoples. So appealing is the story's underlying racist logic that it cannot
be easily undermined by alternative stories. Belief in the story secures a racial
hierarchy of citizenship as much as it relies upon it. That is to say, white citizens come
to believe in their entitlement and at the same time, that entitlement becomes real.
While only some people of colour are rendered juridically unequal by the laws born
of "simple logic", all people of colour are marked by the stories of race, immigrants,
welfare fraud and criminality that abound in the identity documents discussions. The
"undocumented" become stand-ins for the race and no one of colour is free from the
possibility that he or she will be considered illegitimate, fraudulent, and out to get
more than is her due, passports notwithstanding.
My argument focuses on the deployment of the rhetoric of betrayal in the demand for
"proper" identity documents. In liberal democracies overtly racist acts cannot be
tolerated. But if the story of an overtly racist act is transformed into the story of a state
forced to defend itself from bodies bent on betraying its trust, then such acts become
acceptable and even laudable. They become self-defence, our rage justifiable in view
of the extent to which we, extraordinarily generous but gullible, have been tricked.
Citizens learn through such stories who they are. It is in this way that we can speak
of the identity documents provisions as a pedagogy of citizenship, one that is required
in the building of an unequal structure of citizenship. We cannot counter "simple
logic" merely by revealing its underlying incoherence, as most critics of the "docs
rule" have done. The identity documents rule has coherence in the context of the
national story of white innocence and the duplicity and cunning of people of colour.
It has coherence in a fantasy in which dominant subjects come to know themselves as
morally superior, as simply doing what has to be done to preserve home and nation.
This is where we must begin. To contest "simple logic" we must ask what the
fantasy does to bodies as it winds its way through parliament, the media and
through Canadian homes. It constitutes bodies of colour as illegitimate, and white
bodies as entitled; its lifeblood as a story is the notion of the innocence of this white
settler society.
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BILL C-86: 20 "SIMPLE LOGIC" 1992
In over 121 pages, Bill C-86 laboriously spells out the measures Canadians are forced
to take when confronted as they are by an epidemic of welfare fraud and crowds at
the border. For example, Bill C-86 includes a safe country provision denying refugees
who have passed through a "safe" country en route to Canada the right to make a claim.
Immigration officers are given greater powers to determine who has in fact done so.
Family reunification is encouraged but only a restrictive definition of family prevails.
An assortment of security measures, including the identity documents provisions and
the fingerprinting of all refugees, is included. The Bill's obvious goals, to limit the
flow of refugees (most of whom, not coincidentally, are coming from Somalia), and
to scapegoat immigrants and refugees as the source of depleted social resources,
resemble those of the reforms undertaken by a number of other Western states in the
early 1990s. 21 The United States provides the stellar example of the drastic border
policing and internal surveillance measures of the 1990s with California's Proposition
187.22 The underlying logic of Proposition 187 was that if you cut state services to the
"undocumented", they would stop coming since services (welfare, health and educa-
tion) were why they came. Proposition 187 was followed by federal measures to
improve border security and impose higher penalties for those caught smuggling in
the "undocumented", and bills limiting the "undocumented" from accessing education
and health care.23
20. Bill C-86 was debated in an all party legislative committee made up of five members of the ruling
party (the Progressive Conservatives) and three members of the opposition including one member of
the socialist New Democratic Party and two Liberal party members. The committee sat for four
months and heard from fifty witnesses including 19 unions, corporations and individuals, 7 legal
associations and 24 non-governmental organizations. The minister and officials of the Department of
Employment and Immigration also appeared to defend the Bill and answer questions (S. Dumas, An
Analysis of Bill C-86: Canada's Refugee Status Determination Process (Master's Thesis, Department of
Sociology, University of Manitoba, 1995) [unpublished] at 57).
21. For example, German asylum laws were also amended in 1993 to deny asylum to anyone arriving
via "a safe third country" (S. Scheele, "The Politics of Western Immigration" (1995) 3:1 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 277 at 280). Boyd writes of asylum reforms in France for the same
period which grant broader police powers. In these reforms, asylum seekers who commit deliberate
fraud are not granted-asylum. Fraudulent identity documents presumably fall into this category (M.
Boyd, "Jaws of the Crocodile: 1993 Asylum Reforms in France" (1996) 10 Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal 257 at 262). Penalties are imposed on transport carriers who transport (from one
European country to another) an "alien" who does not possess the necessary travel documents
(Boyd, ibid. at 272). Inspired, as was Bill C-86, by the sense that the hordes are coming, French and
German parliamentary rhetoric includes the argument that in cracking down on "bad" refugees, the
road is being paved for "good refugees" who would not then have to endure the ire of the public
when it encounters fraudulent refugees (Boyd, ibid at 269; T. van Dijk, Elite Discourse, supra note 7
at 95. "For their own good", a narrative repeated ad nauseam, ran and continues to run through
Western parliamentary immigration reform.
22. CaL Educ. Code 48215 (a) (West Supp.1995); CaL Health & Safety Code 130 (a) (West Supp.
1995); CaL.Welf.& Inst.Code 10001.5 (West Supp. 1995). For an insightful critique of Proposition
187 see L. Bosniak, "Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National Imagination"
(1996) 28:3 Connecticut Law Review at 555.
23. L. Ocasio, 'The Year of the Immigrant as Scapegoat" (Nov/Dec 1995) XXIX:3 Report on Immigra-
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The welfare-fraud immigrant, the criminal immigrant and the bogus refugee claimant
are the key figures of Bill C-86. As Catherine Dauvergne notes, immigration reform
rhetoric of the nineties combines in this way economic discourse (they drain our
resources), citizenship discourse (citizens' rights are imperilled by the newcomers)
and cultural discourse (their culture is different from ours). These overlapping dis-
courses construct an "Other" against whom the normative citizen is defined. 24 Focus-
sing on the reforms after 1995, Sunera Thobani describes the gendered racism of the
new rhetoric which makes use of the figure of the immigrant woman of colour as a
burden to the state, a figure who threatens the rights of the "legitimate" citizens.
25
Elsewhere I show that both political and media discourse on immigration rely on the
construct of an ideal good immigrant who is a neo-conservative against whom the bad
immigrant (the criminal) is measured, a relationship used to frame Bill C-86 when it
was first presented in parliament. 26
Despite its foundational role, few scholars have analysed the racial logic of Bill C-86
in any depth. Lisa Jacubowski's work on the discursive reproduction of racism is one
early exception. In her analysis of the "safe country" provision and the new powers
given to immigration officials in Bill C-86, Jacubowski documents how much discom-
fort with the changing colour of immigration underscored Conservative policies of the
early nineties. Politicians drew upon the white public's worries about the rise in the
visible minority population to build support for the new immigration measures and
these measures in turn garnered electoral support for the Conservative government.
Plainly put, the official logic was as follows:
If the government can convince Canadians that the source of their economic woes
lies elsewhere - i.e. with the "abusing immigrant" - and that the government is
determined to protect Canada from these opportunistic people, it may be able to
regain some public support and confidence.27
Carefully mapping how political "text and talk" can be devoid of explicit racial
references yet depend implicitly upon racist ideas, Jacubowski identifies a key feature
of political anti-immigration rhetoric when she notes that appeals to racism are
inextricably linked to appeals to the economic insecurities of Canadians: both meet in
a narrative of a nation vulnerable to unscrupulous people of colour.28 The Minister of
Immigration in 1992, Bernard Valcourt, illustrates the narrative's language of betrayal
tion in North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas 13 at 14-17.
24. C. Dauvergne, "Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration Law" (1997) X:2
Can. J. L. & Jur. 323 at 337-341.
25. S. Thobani, Nationalizing Citizens, Bordering Immigrant Women: Globalization and the Racializa-
tion of Citizenship in Late 20th Century Canada (Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, Simon Fraser University, 1998) [unpublished].
26. S. Razack, "Making Canada White: Law and the Policing of Bodies of Colour in the 1990s" (1999)
14:1 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 159.
27. L. Jacubowski, Immigration and the Legalization of Racism (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1997) at
69.
28. Ibid. at 70.
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when he articulates the underlying rationale for Bill C-86. Canadians, he notes, are
characteristically kind and generous but "we don't want to be taken for a ride."29
Although she does not analyse the identity documents rule in Bill C-86, Jacubowski
notices here what I argue below: the national storyline of a nation betrayed and
besieged by people of colour underpins anti-immigration rhetoric of the 1990s enabling
"privately racist ideas to be communicated through language that is publicly defensi-
ble as non-racist. ' 30 For Jacubowski, the racism at work travels from the public to
elites. I would argue, however, along with van Dijk, that the form of racism we find
in elite discourse is a top down phenomenon where elites pre-figure the narratives that
later find popular expression. 3 1 (Like Jacubowski, Van Dijk compared political rhet-
oric in European and American parliaments in the early 1990s and noted that politi-
cians made characteristic argumentative moves that produced racist effects without
requiring an explicit language of racism. For example, all of the parliaments he studied
presented themselves as generous but forced to take harsh measures against unscru-
pulous people who abused their trust.)
32
In examining the discourse around identity documents in Bill C-86, it is possible to
trace the same rhetorical ploys and semantic practices noted by Jacubowski and van
Dijk and come to the same conclusion, namely that such linguistic and narrative
strategies allow racist ideas to be communicated in ways that are difficult to pin down
as racism. For example, the conflation of internal and external enemies (illegal
immigrants and welfare abusers) evident through Bill C-86 marks many of the
discussions around identity documents, as I show below: we must insist on documents
because if we don't know who people are when they come in, they can go on to defraud
welfare using a variety of fake names. To give these assertions a context in which they
might be understood, Conservative politicians deliberately pursued a linguistic strat-
egy of conflating the illegal migrant and the Convention Refugee through the use of
the term "undocumented". Convention Refugees are not in fact "undocumented", as
the phrase is commonly used in the United States, i.e. to describe someone who has
snuck into the country without applying for entry. Convention Refugees undergo a
rigorous hearing procedure in which the establishment of identity is an important part.
Confronted with the issue of Somalis and Afghanis without documents, for example,
the Immigration and Refugee Board developed procedures that would enable it to
assess identity, the lack of legitimate passports or travel documents notwithstanding.
33
Further, many refugees are "documented" but the documents they possess have been
assessed by officials at the border as insufficient for the purposes of establishing
identity. The difference in legal status between a Convention Refugee and an individ-
ual who has not gone through any official channels did not stop Canadian politicians
29. Ibid. at 71 [emphasis added].
30. Ibid. at 89.
31. van Dijk, supra note 7.
32. Ibid. at 49-114.
33. Immigration and Refugee Board, "Commentary on Undocumented and Improperly Documented
Claimants. Assessing the Evidence, Enhancing the Procedures" (11 March 1997).
"Simple Logic"
from deploying the rhetoric of "undocumented". In adopting this term, the Canadian
government made sure that an aura of criminality would cling to people whose claims
have in fact been accepted and who are thus legally present in Canada.
34
I do not want simply to contribute to the analysis of Bill C-86 by demonstrating, with
respect to the identity provisions, the narrative and linguistic moves that enable the
communication of racist ideas, although they bear noting when the task is to decode
"simple logic". Instead, I want to move from the disembodied realm of linguistic
devices to the speakers themselves. That is, how do the speakers of the dominant
narratives understand themselves; from what place do they "live the nation"?
35
Fantasy is a useful notion when trying to capture how individuals imagine the
landscape in which they are living and in which their own identities take shape.
Utilizing fantasy in her work, Lauren Berlant writes that the concept designates "how
national culture becomes local - through the images, narratives, monuments and sites
that circulate through personal/collective consciousness. ' 36 Through these images and
narratives, citizens are taught to personally and collectively imagine who they are and
"to perceive the nation as an intimate quality of identity."
'37
The national fantasy - the images and narratives that animate Bill C-86 - has a very
simple structure: who We are versus who They are, and the laws we require to protect
ourselves from this difference. In 1992, the Bill's framers insisted that we were a
nation besieged: the country faced a huge backlog of applications from persons
seeking to enter Canada either as immigrants or refugees. 38 Making the case for greater
vigilance, the Minister of Immigration, Bernard Valcourt asked reasonably, "Who
could refute that in a country like Canada, facing all of these pressures of these mass
movements of people, our immigration officers don't have the power to do their
jobs?"39 Such powers as the Bill intended to give to immigration officials could be
defended by relying on a long-standing national narrative. We attract more than our
share of immigrants and refugees because we are known to be fair-minded, democratic
and generous. As Valcourt put it simply: "We are a trusted country in the world."40 In
a country where "citizenship means something", we are naturally overrun by those
who want what we have. As a result, against our nature, we are forced to impose harsh
measures such as the fingerprinting of all asylum seekers but only until we are sure
of the identities of those who come to our door. At such time, the fingerprint records
will be erased, the interminable wait for full citizenship will be over, and the new
Canadian will become equal to "the baby who is born Canadian" with all its rights
34. J. Dryer, supra note 11 at 181.
35. L. Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia and Everyday Life (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991) at 3.
36. Ibid. at 5.
37. Ibid. at 20.
38. Minutes, supra note 1 at 2:6.
39. Ibid. 2:9-10 (B. Valcourt).
40. Ibid. 2:5 (B. Valcourt).
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intact.41 It would all be worthwhile. (By the end of the decade, of course, this image
could no longer be used since babies born on Canadian soil but of refugee parents no
longer had access to health care in the province of Ontario.)
The government offers few facts and figures in support of its narrative of siege and
betrayal. In place of specifics, two stories circulate to give content to the threat. The
first is a story about smuggling rings and the second is one of welfare fraud. The two
stories come together, such as when Brian Grant, Director, Control Policy, Department
of Employment and Immigration, tells the committee that "undocumented" arrivals
were unheard of in 1976 whereas in 1992, smuggling and counterfeiting have become
sophisticated and many more people are coming to realise that Canada is a land of
opportunity, a land worth getting to for its social benefits. 42 Here the siege narrative
is bolstered by the idea that Canada is a popular destination because it is so generous
to its citizens. Significantly, if people are "undocumented", it is only because they are
smuggled in. "Undocumented" is conflated in this logic with criminality.
Identity documents enter this story as the bridge between our reputation and the
proposed harsh measures. The problem facing Canada is presented as a simple one.
In the words of the Minister: "It is absolutely impossible to board any plane in the
world without documents, yet they come here and land at our airports without the trace
of a document. That is impossible. '43 He continues with an analysis of the problem
and its solution:
We know one thing. There is this multi-million-dollar business of smuggling, and of
consultants abusing people out there, and they are being encouraged to do that
because those poor people are being exploited. We understand that. But if that
person came along and said listen, this is not a proper document, this is a forged
document, I had to do this to flee persecution, that will never be held against that
person in Canada. But the person who comes here and then plays with I don't know
who... There are smugglers in air planes who collect all the papers of the people. It
creates problems. That is why we have created this disincentive to people by saying
that if they come to Canada they had better have their documents, because with this
guaranteed legislated benefit of the doubt, they will not get like the others who
follow the rules and come here honestly, saying I had to have these documents -
they are not mine - because I wanted in. That is why we did that.44
A figure emerges, shadowed by another: people who "follow the rules" (and confess
their documents are false) highlight for us the treachery of those who don't follow the
rules, rely on smugglers, and destroy their documents. Our rules will benefit the former
and catch the latter. Holders of fraudulent documents will not be penalized. A torturous
distinction must then be made between the moral character of those who commit fraud
and those who destroy their documents.45 That these two figures are different remains
41. Ibid. at 2:9.
42. Ibid. at 3:48-49,50.
43. Ibid. at 2:8.
44. Ibid.
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an article of faith, bolstered by the testimony of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
that smuggling rings exist and the testimony of officials of airline companies who
opine that smugglers get refugees to turn in their documents to the smuggler who
already has the right of legal entry, so that they can be reused.
46
The logic of the identity documents provisions is fragile from the start. Fake docu-
ments are preferable to destroyed documents. Refugees are the hapless victims of
smugglers, yet they must be punished for destroying their documents. Intended as a
disincentive for people who destroy their documents, and ultimately as a barrier
against smuggling rings, the identity provisions rely on the notion that people who use
smuggling rings are probably not bona fide Convention Refugees. Yet, given the
number of roadblocks in the way of refugees from Africa (many of whom are women
and children) making their way to Canada (few Canadian immigration offices in the
region, no direct flights to Canada, the vigilance of airline companies, and so on), it
is difficult to arrive at the Canadian border without recourse to such smuggling rings.
"Simple logic" soon begins to move beyond the story of smuggling rings. The goal,
it turns out, is not only to stop smuggling rings, as becomes apparent in the discussion
of fingerprinting and identity documents. This is only where it begins. If we fingerprint
refugees, we will be able to detect which I.D. belongs to whom, and thus stop the
smuggling rings. "The issue is not criminality, the issue is identity," the Minister
insists, but the two are in fact indivisible when he adds:
And you get the added benefit that on the domestic scene you can exchange this
information with provincial governments who have to cope with not many, but too
many, who abuse the welfare system because of their position as refugee claim-
ants.47
Having to produce identity documents at the outset, then, will encourage refugees not
to abuse the welfare system. Responding to a question about the relationship between
the identity provisions and welfare fraud, the Minister offers his welfare story: "You
must remember the case in Montreal where a person made 14 different claims under
14 different names and was getting 14 welfare checks. '48 The Bill will help, he assures
the Conservative member for Bramalea-Gore-Malton, Harry Chadwick, in dealing
with welfare, unemployment and credit card fraud. 49 We learn that in
one city alone 60 people are alleged to have collected about $2 million through
fraudulent welfare claims. At least one person is alleged to have used seven differ-
ent identities to obtain multiple welfare cheques.
Some suggest that such numbers are a very small proportion of all claimants. Does
that mean that we should do nothing?50
45. Ibid. at 14:28.
46. lbid. at4:lO1.
47. Ibid. at 2:9.
48. Ibid. at 2:22.
49. Ibid. at 2:28.
50. Ibid. at 13:12.
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Identity documents, then, protect us from the enemy outside our borders and the enemy
within. They even reduce stereotyping of immigrants. Brian Grant spells out these
connections in detail when he contrasts the nice side of immigration, "bringing
families together", with the "dark side":
I begin then with a very simple question that we ask ourselves: what is the business
we're in, and who exactly are we protecting when we speak about protecting soci-
ety? I think the answer to that is threefold. The first is that we protect the Canadian
public from threats to their health, safety, or security. The second is that we protect
public institutions. A prime example of this is the medical and social services in
Canada. One of the important additions to the 1976 act was the concept of excessive
demand, which I will speak about more fully in a moment. This reflected the then
fledgling universal medicare system that had been introduced nine years earlier.
This is the second real thrust of who we think we should be protecting. The third is
the immigration system itself. I think there are two goals in protecting the immigra-
tion system. The first is to preserve the system for legitimate immigrants and refu-
gees. The second is to ensure that there is support for immigration - that the system
is a controlled system, it is perceived as a controlled system - and in that way
contribute to a positive response to immigration and a reduction of negative stereo-
types that could build up."5 l
Since identity documents in and of themselves cannot specifically tell us who is a
genuine Convention Refugee and who is not, nor who will abuse our systems and who
will not, their value lies elsewhere. They tell us more generally about an individual's
intrinsic moral character. In the words of Grant, they tell us who is truthful:
We expect truthfulness in response to our questions. We expect the appropriate
documentation from anyone coming forward, seeking to enter Canada. Once they
are in Canada, we ask that they renew their documents as required. Finally, we ask
that they respect Canadian law. That's essentially what the control is based on.52
Refugees who admit that they have forged documents are at least being truthful in the
moment of interrogation, and will not therefore be penalized, confirms John Butt,
Director, Protection Policy, Department of Employment and Immigration. 53 (In fact,
the law makes no distinction between those without documents and those with fake
documents. Butt's statement is here part of the government's own duplicity.) The
rhetoric of truth-seeking strikes a chord in listeners, not only because of its superficial
logic (of course people should be truthful and trusting of the Canadian government),
but also, as I suggest below, because of who the unnamed liars are: refugees of colour
whose duplicity and criminality are easily believed in. The demand for documents also
has a pedagogic purpose: it teaches refugees who Canadians are and Canadians in this
scenario are simply reasonable people who demand honesty. One wonders if the logic
here turns on the view that refugees are not likely to be people who value honesty as
do Canadians.
51. Ibid. at 3:46.
52. Ibid. at 3:47.
53. Ibid. at 3:89.
"Simple Logic"
Immigration officials admit to committee members that documents can be lost during
the conditions of flight and that refugees might be reluctant to admit possessing forged
documents at the border for fear of being turned back, and for fear of implicating others
still left at home. They acknowledge too that complicated identity issues are better
dealt with during the formal asylum hearing. 54 These acknowledgements, however,
do not disturb "simple logic". As the chairman of the committee simply reaffirms at
the end of the day, if refugees do not have identity documents, it is likely because a
smuggler made them get rid of them.55 In this story, a refugee who gets to our borders
without identity documents is someone we do not know, and someone who is likely
to defraud us, as well as someone who is duped by smugglers. Her character and
history are fixed for us in the moment of the encounter at the border. She is not someone
with a past - although she is someone with a guessed-at future - that of welfare abuser.
When we examine more closely the encounters between Conservative committee
members and critics of the identity documents provisions, the figure that gives "simple
logic" its coherency is further revealed. For example, when Lucya Spencer of the
National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada describes
at length the difficult conditions of flight for women and the necessity of using forged
documents, and when she notes that of 30,000 refugee welfare claims in 1991, only
43 were of a fraudulent nature, Fernand Jourdenais, a government member, replies
contemptuously and patriarchally that these facts amount to a claim that we should
simply take refugees at their word when we first encounter them:
Should we accept a person who states "Mon nom est Lucya Spencer and I am an
honest girl"? How do I know who you are if I cannot really prove that you are? 56
Ignoring her reply that identity can surely be established in an asylum hearing and that
fraud is rare,57 he simply reasserts "one bad one is one bad one." The figure of the
refugee who is likely to deceive generous and unsuspecting Canadians is held as
trump, introduced time and again by Conservative politicians to win the rounds.
A similar encounter transpires between Pascual Delgado of the Canadian Hispanic
Council when he offers details as to why Latin American refugees are unlikely to have
documents. His counter-story elicits the following emotion-laden response from Ross
Reid, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment and the representative for St. John's East:
God forbid that I would defend the bureaucrats in this particular area, but my
experience I have to tell you, is that their obsession is not so much to keep people
out. Their obsession is to know who it is that they are dealing with. My experience -
and it tends to be limited to the horn of Africa, Central America, the eastern Euro-
pean situation and Newfoundland - has been very much one where they say, "If I
54. Ibid. at 3:101 (Harder); and 4:25 (Schlew).
55. Ibid. at 12:33.
56. Ibid. at 5:10.
57. Ibid. at 5:17.
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know who you are, I do not have a big problem with you being in Canada, as long
as you are dealing with me straight. Don't try to rip me off as the immigration
officer. Don't, at least in my sight, try to rip off the system." That is more the
obsession I see. It is not to keep people out. Even the toughest immigration officers
that I know in Newfoundland, who would be just as happy to line people up against
the wall, are the first ones to call the Association for New Canadians and say, "This
person is dealing with the system in an honest and direct way; help him." That is
what I tend to see. I tend to see much more an obsession with the idea that, "I would
really like to know who you are, and if you are going to be straight with me I am
going to help you." It is not to keep people out.58
Here the speaker repeats three times that it is honesty he wants, an honesty that can
only be revealed in the production of identity documents at the border. In effect, Reid
details the script that refugees must learn and perform. They must learn that Canadians
are straightforward people who only want the truth. If the obsessive need to "know
who we are dealing with", repeated like a talisman to ward off any complicating
details, is convincing, it is because the unknown native is a powerful and historical
symbol for white people.
Speakers who contest the main story of a kind, truth-loving and generous nation are
met with a defensiveness that verges on hysteria. Few witnesses bring up the subject
of racism but when they do, an immediate and vehement denial and censure emerges.
Dan Philip of the Black Coalition of Quebec opens his presentation with a reminder
to the committee that the Minister of Immigration recently remarked in the House that
the majority of Somalis were nomads who did not want to come to Canada anyway.
Phillip describes the Minister's statement as "one of the most punishing statements
made by a minister in recent times, because the people of Somalia, some of whom are
here, have been trying to get their families here." 59 By tying in such statements to the
privileged treatment accorded to the white-skinned refugees from Yugoslavia, 60 and
noting the unequal treatment of Haitian refugees, Mr. Philip is immediately seen to
have crossed the line of civilized communication. Mr. Fee takes him to task:
I do have a problem with some of your language ... You described the refugee
determination system as hell and yet the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a
representative from the Carnegie Foundation, and other credible groups have all
told us our program is an example for the world and one of the best. Our acceptance
rate is extremely high. There are actually very few people rejected. So I find it
difficult to accept your argument that our determination system is all that bad. 6 1
When Philip clarifies that he was speaking of responses to specific groiups, and notably
to Somalis, he receives another defensive explosion from Mr. Fee: the entire world
was caught unawares by Somalia and nobody was able to respond quickly. Canada
58. Ibid. at 7:148 [emphasis added].
59. Ibid. at 12:41.
60. Ibid. at 12:42.
61. Ibid. at 12:50.
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shouldn't be singled out for blame. As Mr. Fee puts it: "We recognise that the situation
is bad, but what would you have us do beyond what we are doing?" 62 Phillip patiently
explains again what could be done and Fee still replies: "We are a small nation; ...
[t]here is a limit to what a small nation can do."' 63 Phillip encounters here moral outrage
that follows the naming of racism; his points remain out of bounds, impolite, accusa-
tory and exaggerated accounts which committee members can only dismiss. Within
the official narrative under construction in these exchanges, innocent Canadians who
are doing all they can now confront people with whom they are deeply unfamiliar and
whom they have reason to suspect. Members of the government note that some of the
people seeking entry have "lived on the fringes of legitimacy", 64 and may be people
who are "simply not suitable for this particular country". 65 This is why Canada must
insist- on "knowing who people are".
The "chaos" of Africa makes the task of identifying people both imperative and
difficult. As the Chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Board explains to the
committee, Canadians face a special challenge in knowing who Somalis are (and thus
in protecting themselves from being duped by them). Gordon Fairweather, repeating
the colonial story of Somalia as a land beset by warring tribes, a story Catherine
Besteman describes as a reformulation of the story "they are all so primitive in
Africa", 66 suggests that when we (in the civilized North) find ourselves in the middle
of this tribal mess, we can only find our way out again when we are able to confirm
the tribal identity of the players. 67 If the demand for identity documents makes sense,
it is largely because it is the only way in which order can be imposed on the alien
masses at the border. How else can one deal with such an onslaught of foreignness?
The critics of Bill C-86 who appear before the legislative committee must struggle
with the implacable logic of the envious and foreign hordes at the border. Their
counter-stories have little impact. Professor James Hathaway asks why Canada would
penalize someone for document destruction after one member of the Immigration and
Refugee Board has already established that he or she is a bona fide Convention
refugee. 68 Warren Allmand, a Liberal member of parliament reminds the committee
that the Geneva Convention makes clear that refugees must not be turned back because
they lack suitable documents. He notes that refugees are afraid to admit they have
forged documents, for fear this will be later used to assess the truthfulness of their
claim to persecution. 69 In any event, as he and several others, including the Refugee
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. at 12:52.
64. Ibid. at 15:27 (Friesen).
65. Ibid. at 15:32 (Reid).
66. C. Besteman, "Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia" (1996) 11:1 Cultural Anthropology
120 at 129-133.
67. Minutes, supra note 1 at 5:83.
68. Ibid. at7:115.
69. Ibid. at 3:89.
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Lawyers Association70 note, refugees must produce confirmation of their identity at
the refugee hearing. When they fail to establish identity, their claims for asylum
usually fail. In the refugee hearing, however, identity is not established solely through
official documents such as passports and travel documents.
71
Refugee advocates appearing before the legislative committee repeatedly confirm that
more often than not, refugees must resort to false documents and that, owing to their
histories of state persecution, they will believe smugglers over the Canadian govern-
ment when advised to destroy documents.72 Immigrant associations such as the
Multilingual Orientation Services Association for Immigrant Communities go into
considerable detail about the conditions of flight of the refugees they know. For
example, Fiona Begg describes the political context of refugees who are native people
from Guatemala (where the military deliberately bums records), whose histories of
persecution are easily corroborated by means other than passports or birth certificates.
Ted Walker of the Alberta Association of Immigrant Serving Agencies adds that the
Immigration and Refugee Board has been known to suspect the credibility of claimants
who have documents based on the inference that someone who possesses documents
was probably not in a great deal of danger.73 These arguments and narrative strategies
are no match for the figures that give coherency to "simple logic" - the duplicitous
native, the tribal unknown. The Bill passes in December 1992, becoming law in
February 1993.
THE UNDOCUMENTED CONVENTION REFUGEE IN CANADA CLASS:
"SIMPLE LOGIC" 1996
Three years following the passage of Bill C-86, a Liberal government proposes to
remedy the hardship s. 46.04(8) imposes on Somalis and Afghanis. In the tone of
someone granting special rights, the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement published
in the Canada Gazette (1996)7 4 establishes the creation of a special class of refugees
who can be landed despite their lack of documents. Convention refugees from Somalia
and Afghanistan are first described in the Statement as innocent victims of regimes
that have more or less collapsed. The hardships of not being landed are duly noted, in
particular the delay in the reunification of families. However, the government makes
clear, the plight of such refugees must be balanced against Canada's need to protect
itself from a small minority of individuals who conceal their country of origin and
identity in order to receive protection. Requiring refugees to wait five years before
earning the right to permanent residency gives the government time to establish who
is criminal and who is not. The Regulations are vague about how this might be done,
70. Ibid. at 5:58.
71. Ibid. at 3:100.
72. See for example Amnesty International, 4A:8-10; Inter-Church Committee for Refugees 4:69 in
Minutes, supra note 1.
73. Ibid. at 12:29.
74. Regulations, supra note 13.
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other than to work with the communities in question and to assess "conduct" (in lieu
of the background checks done with other applicants) during the five years. The
lengthy waiting period is acknowledged but firmly endorsed as necessary in order "to
test, over time, the ongoing willingness of those refugees to respect the laws and norms
of Canadian society". 75 "Simple logic" remains intact, although slightly muted in the
Regulatory Statement. The country has a right to protect itself from those who seek
to defraud it and it must teach Convention Refugees to respect the laws of Canada,
according to the new Minister of Immigration Lucienne Robillard. Reminiscent of the
earlier discussions about teaching refugees to be honest, the figure of the alien migrant
who is unlikely to know about honesty and respect for the rule of law highlights the
civility and moral superiority of Canadians. Less punitive than s. 46.04(8), the creation
of the UCRCC nonetheless establishes a penalty and one that is quite substantial: a
five-year wait for equal citizenship. The penalty is justified for those who have not
yet demonstrated their qualifications to receive the full benefits of citizenship.
In the hearings of the legislative committee, a committee now made up of fewer
Conservatives, 76 fidelity to "simple logic" is once again most evident in the responses
of officials from the Department of Immigration and from Conservative members of
parliament. Both simply reiterate that it is reasonable for Canada to know who it is
dealing with, and that five years allows us to tell who is a criminal and who is not.77
Val Meredith, the Reform member for Surrey-White Rock-South Langley, illustrates
the narrative conventions of "simple logic" best when she asks, no less than ten times
during a ten-minute exchange with two witnesses appearing before the committee,
"[i]s it unfair of Canada as a country to expect to receive, at the point of entry, some
documentation of identity, some travel documentation?" 78 The question, re-phrased
only slightly each time and asked of two witnesses who attempt to explain alternative
means of establishing identity, turns on an abstraction: the right of Canada to know,
through identity documents given at the point of entry, who it is dealing with. No
75. Ibid. at 3258.
76. The House of Commons of Canada Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration met to
discuss and hear witnesses regarding the landing of "'undocumented" refugees, in three separate
meetings over the course of two days. Meetings nos. 31 & 32 were held on 3 December 1996;
meeting no. 33 was held on 5 December 1996. Among the eight committee members were (at least)
five Liberal MPs, one Reform, and one Bloc MP. The committee heard evidence from a total of 23
witnesses. The first meeting of December 3 heard evidence from two witnesses from the Department
of Citizenship and Immigration; the second meeting of December 3 heard evidence from one member of
the Immigration and Refugee Board and from two community legal representatives; the third meeting of
December 5 heard evidence from eighteen witnesses representing various community and legal associa-
tions such as the Canadian Bar Association, the Catholic Immigration Center, the Afghan Association of
Ontario, and the Somali Council for Refugees. The committee tabled its report to the House of Commons
of Canada on 12 December 1996. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Report, 2d Sess., 31 st Legislature (12 Dec. 1996), Hansard at 7423.
77. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Meetings No. 31 & 32
(December 3, 1996), No. 33 (December 5 1996) at 31:1-4 (Jeff Lebane, Director General of Refu-
gees) [hereinafter Standing Committee].
78. Ibid. at 33:7-9 (V. Meredith).
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context is allowed, such as why it might be that a legitimate Convention Refugee
would not be able to respect this right. This is perhaps the outstanding feature of
"simple logic": its reliance on "simple referentiality", a bounded system of logic that
ruthlessly excludes anything outside of its own limited parameters. 79 Further, as
literary studies theorist Homi Bhabha points out, the realist features of this kind of
logic, its "transparent factuality" (what you see is what you get), is structurally similar
to colonial logic: the Other can only be known on the coloniser's terms. 80 In this case,
the coloniser can insist on knowing the colonised in ways that are impossible for the
latter to fulfill. The Other cannot win under these terms and conditions, described here
as fairness and straight dealing.
If the right to police the border is paramount, and excludes all other considerations,
then the other features of "simple logic" become defensible. Meredith insists repeat-
edly that to grant any exceptions to the documents rule is to reward people who destroy
their documents and to send the message that Canada's borders are wide open.8 1 Here,
as in the C-86 discussions, these arguments appeal to those who believe that the
"crowds" at the border, the "hundreds of millions of mobile individuals seeking a
different life worldwide - people in movement looking for a better life" simply want
what we have. Clearly, then "Canada cannot possibly take all the people who would
like a better life economically. '8 2 Within "simple logic", refugees are often bogus.
83
To create the UCRCC will simply invite more fraud. Refugees will simply claim to
be Somali in order to get in.
84
Witnesses who appear before the Standing Committee on Immigration attempt to
expand the boundaries of "simple logic", as was done in the C-86 discussions. Chantal
Tie of the South Ottawa Community Legal Services attempts to refute the "simple
logic" refrain that we must know who people are by pointing out that we do know who
they are, either through alternative documents or through corroborating evidence
provided in the refugee hearing. She notes that we will not know them in any different
way after five years.85 Others speak of immigration's "document fetish" where only
a few very limited documents are acceptable and where what is an acceptable
document remains highly arbitrary.86 It is again pointed out that documents are very
79. J. Gallop, "Quand nos lvres s'6crivent: Irigaray's Body Politic" (1983) 74:1 Romanic Review 77 at
83. Gallop is cited in this regard in I. Chambers, "Narratives of Nationalism: Being 'British' in E.
Crater, J. Donald, & J. Squires, eds., Space & Place: Theories of Identity and Location (London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1993) 145 at 151.
80. H. Bhabha, "The Other question: difference, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism" in F.
Baker, P. Hulme, M. Iversen, and D. Loxley, Literature, Politics and Theory (London and New
York: Methuen, 1986) 148 at 165. Bhabha's point is cited by Chambers, ibid. at 153.
81. Standing Committee, supra note 76 at 31:5; 31:6; 31:21; 33:35 (V. Meredith).
82. Ibid. at 33:41 (V. Meredith).
83. Ibid. at 33:49 (V. Meredith).
84. Ibid. at 32:15 (V. Meredith).
85. Ibid. at 32:9-12 (C. Tie).
86. Ibid. at 33:1 (N. Worsfold); 33:3 (L. Affi).
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difficult for refugees to access. Rivka Augenfeld, a refugee lawyer, reminds the
committee that some of the Jews fleeing Nazi Germany were saved only because Raoul
Wallenberg, a Swedish ambassador, provided them with false documents.8 7 Mohamed
Tabit, representing Midaynta, a Somali Aid organization, tells of babies born during
flight who could not possibly possess documents. 88 Witnesses make many of the
same arguments as in the earlier discussions. They note, for example, that most of
the "undocumented" are women and children, that war criminals are usually very
careful to evade detection once in the country, and that in any event, it is possible
to deport a permanent resident who is later found to be a war criminal. Often these
objections can only be stated incredulously, so little sense does "simple logic"
make once one leaves its narrow confines of fair-minded Canadians and duplicitous
Africans. Contesting the five-year wait, Chantal Tie asks whether it is "the Minister's
understanding that a war criminal is going to be caught shoplifting and we'll suddenly
know who they are." 89 David Matas comments that asking Convention Refugees to
wait five years before being landed is "a funny way of trying to engender respect for
Canadian laws." 90
Unlike its 1992 counterpart, the Standing Committee is moved by some of these
arguments and stories. In its final report, it recommends a two-year waiting period and
the eligibility of children of refugees for sponsorship as soon as an application for
permanent resident status is made. It also recommends that guidelines be developed
as to what constitutes suitable documents, a recommendation that even the dissenting
Conservative members support. Surprisingly, in spite of the committee's recommen-
dations, "simple logic" survives relatively intact once again. Even when the Conser-
vative members of the committee are a distinct minority and the government is a
Liberal one, the government rejects the committee's recommendations. On January
19, 1997, the Regulations are passed and the five-year wait remains in place. Its
inconsistencies and impracticalities are swept aside on the strength of an impregnable
internal logic: Canada is besieged and betrayed at every turn and must adopt stern
measures to police its borders. We can only surmise that most members of the House
agree with (or see the political advantage of) this narrative and believe, on the one
hand, in the existence of highly suspect people of colour who need to be watched and,
on the other, "original citizens" who must patiently teach these "Others" the decep-
tively "simple" terms of Canadian respect and decency.
FINDING RACISM IN "SIMPLE LOGIC": 2000
Faced with the immovability of "simple logic", and the seeming rationality of a
country protecting its borders from the unscrupulous, only a few critics have suggested
that racism is what enables the identity documents rule to find support over the past
87. Ibid. at 33:52.
88. Ibid. at 33:3.
89. Ibid. at31:12.
90. Ibid. at 33:20.
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decade.91 In 1999, when Canada accepted 5000 refugees from Kosovo and exempted
them from the identity documents provisions, racism surfaced briefly as a plausible
explanation for the differential treatment meted out to Somalis and Afghanis. Refugees
from Kosovo were fast-tracked, granted permanent residence status and assisted with
family reunification; all such benefits were denied to Somalis. 92 Since the refugees
from Kosovo are white and the Somalis are Black, one newspaper columnist has
suggested that racism is the most obvious explanation for the imposition of a five-year
wait on Somalis and Afghanis. 93 These few moments aside, critics of the identity
documents provisions have mainly stayed in the less confrontational realm of dispro-
portionate impact and systemic discrimination, concepts that do not produce the
defensiveness that a charge of racism does. Thus, the Somali community, immigration
lawyers, human rights analysts, scholars and activists point out the rule's dispropor-
tionate impact on Somalis and Afghanis whose countries of origin remain in a state of
collapse. They note once again that many refugees are forced to flee without docu-
ments, are often endangered if they do carry them, and in any event, can usually prove
who they are in an adjudication hearing once safely inside Canadian borders. Legal
scholars add that the identity documents provisions contravene various international
Conventions to which Canada is a signatory. These scholars demonstrate how slight
the relationship is between the rule and its declared objective of catching war criminals
and welfare abusers. 94 It seems clear, Julia Dryer concludes, that the war criminals
who are the object of the Bill are likely to be individuals in the best position to obtain
identity documents given that many would have been officials in the former Somali
government of Sayed Barre. More to the point, since eighty percent of those without
documents are women and children, who are highly unlikely to have been government
officials, Dryer reasonably concludes that the Undocumented Convention Refugee in
Canada Class regulation is intended to work on a symbolic rather than on a practical
level. 95
It is in the realm of the symbolic that it becomes difficult to steer clear of the issue of
racism. The figures who inhabit the land of "simple logic", the refugee bent on
deceiving us, the alien who must be taught, and the Canadian who is envied for all the
good things his or her country offers, is eerily reminiscent of Franz Fanon's description
of the coloniser and the colonized. The colonized man is an envious man, Fanon writes:
"And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly,
always on the defensive, 'they want to take our place' ."96 How does it come to be that
a complex situation, a refugee fleeing persecution and a nation assessing his or her
91. Chantal Tie suggests to the committee: "We're denying landing to people who are black." Standing
Committee, supra note 77 at 32:9.
92. Citizenship and Immigration, News Update "Refugees from Kosovo" (10 May 1999) 1.
93. M. Landsberg, "Why Waive Unfair Rules Only for Kosovar Refugees?" The Toronto Star (17 April
1999) Section L at 1.
94. Dryer, Brouwer, supra note 11.
95. Dryer, ibid. 165 at 179.
96. F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Random House, 1963) at 39.
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story, can be reduced to the "simple logic" of knowing "who we are dealing with" at
a single moment in time through a passport or a travel document, even a forged one?
Such a determined decontextualization and an insistent return to the simple narrative
that "we must know who they are" draws its strength from another underlying colonial
notion. Fanon is instructive here:
It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of
the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian
character of colonial exploitation, the settler paints the native as a quintessence of
evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not
enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still
better never existed in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to
ethics ... 97
The threat that the immoral native poses only subsides when we contain it: "In the
colonial context, the settler only ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter
admits loudly and intelligibly the supremacy of the white man's values. '98 The settler
needs to be reassured that the native has left behind the vestiges of tribalism. Five
years' wait is not too long a time to tell if the mud of the native town still clings to
him or her.
The race shadow behind the insistence on identity documents and on the five-year wait
helps to understand why the very logical counter arguments proposed by critics of the
identity provisions carry so little weight. As Toni Morrison writes, "contradiction,
incoherence and emotional disorder 'fit' when the subject is black." 99 There need not
be a logic given "the general miasma of black incoherence." 100 The figure of the
refugee in these discussions is simultaneously the hapless victim of smugglers, the
persecuted and also the wily and cunning traitor who will turn around the first chance
he gets and abuse our generosity (although the majority of refugees without documents
are women). These shadows circulate in the text giving substance to the story of our
need to know "who they are" and our need to make them wait for the full benefits of
citizenship. The story thus acquires a kind of coherency and logic it would not
otherwise have. If we believe that refugees can lose their documents, and are at risk
when they carry them, how can we penalize those who cannot immediately confirm
their identities with documents? We can do so if we are equally convinced that the
refugee bodies of the 1990s are capable of, and indeed bent on deceiving us. And if
we see ourselves as having the right and the obligation to teach them about our
unquestionably "superior" values.
97. Ibid. at 41 [emphasis added].
98. Ibid. at 43.
99. T. Morrison, "The Official Story: Dead Man Golfing" in T. Morrison & C. Brodsky, eds., Birth of a
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Books, 1997) vii at ix.
100. Ibid.
(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Who is the subject who might believe so easily that s/he is besieged and likely to be
deceived, the subject who believes s/he must teach Others his values? Writing of the
social construction of whiteness, Richard Dyer describes the ways in which whites
have constructed themselves in a story of origins as moral and virtuous, capacities
which have enabled them to tell the story of having "developed" (rather than colo-
nized) lands occupied by others. The Canadian national story, Dyer writes, relying on
the work of Carl Berger (1966), is a characteristic one in this respect with its rhetoric
and imagery of enterprising and hardy citizens of a cold land who through their hard
work have forged a nation out of nothing.101 In this compressed narrative, white people
become the original inhabitants since it is only they who are cast as capable of making
the country what it is. They bring order and civilization where previously there was
none, a logic that survives intact in the responses of Canadian courts to Aboriginal
land claims. 102 A story of origins thus told depends on the erasure of non-white
inhabitants and on their inferiority. Either the land was empty or it was filled by those
too lacking in enterprise to develop it. To be white is to be honourable, square-dealing
and enterprising, while to be non-white is to be dissolute and dishonest, a national
mythology that has considerable historical and contemporary appeal for both elite and
non-elite white citizen subjects. Reviewing Canadian nationalist thinkers of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including political leaders, historians, social com-
mentators and prominent writers, Berger explores the logic of the myths and legends
upon which these thinker relied in order to promote nationalist feeling. The myth of
greater commitment of Northern peoples for liberty, for example, contained the
following logic:
Liberty itself depended on self-reliance, a rugged independence, instilled by the
struggle for existence. Thus to the equation of "northern" with strength and the
strenuous virtues, against "southern" with degeneration and effeminacy, was added
the identification of the former with liberty and the latter with tyranny. 103
Canadian nationalist, Berger concludes, has relied on this notion that stronger and
superior Northern peoples have a greater capacity for governing themselves and a
correspondingly greater commitment to liberty, while Southern peoples without such
values, undermine the nation. The national mythology has often appeared its most
vigorous in immigration debates. In the official constructions of Chinese immigration,
constructions that led up to the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923,104 Kay Anderson
writes, Canada "appears scripted in official texts as a pure space, one that if impreg-
nated by the flow of alien material would become contaminated and offer up inferior
'stock'."105
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The story of origins and its immigration narrative, to which Richard Dyer, Carl Berger
and Kay Anderson refer, is in evidence in the CBC documentary "A Place Called
Dixon" which aired on prime time news in November of 1993, some months after Bill
C-86 took effect. A documentary about an area (and apartment buildings on a specific
street, Dixon Avenue) in Toronto where many Somalis live, the film tells the story of
white Canadians as the original occupants of Dixon. Now overcrowded and feeling
overrun, these "original" inhabitants describe "tribal" Somalis who abuse welfare. The
Somalis, for their part, describe racist incidents including racist police, security guards
who name their dogs "Mohammad" and "Allah" and who defend their harassment of
Somali youth with the comment that "you all look the same." Ostensibly presenting
both sides of the story, the documentary nonetheless devotes considerable time to the
story of white citizens who welcomed Somalis and who now have to adapt to a new
reality in their country where it is not possible to ride in an elevator with another white
person. Far less time is devoted to exploring the comments of Somalis who are
interviewed and who comment that Canadians do not know what Somalis have been
through. Voice-overs suggest that terrible things have indeed happened to Somalis
(things from which we have saved them?) but by the film's end, we are none the wiser
although we have hints that what has happened to Somalis has to do with violence and
"tribal" warfare. A defiant comment by a young Somali woman that Canadian land is
stolen land does little to disturb the central narrative of an innocent people suddenly
inundated with things and people they don't fully understand. 10 6 "A Place Called
Dixon" invites Canadian viewers into a specific place from which to safely view and
live their nation - a place in which white inhabitants are besieged and betrayed. Such
images and storylines enable dominant individuals to "feel" their citizenship, 107 and
to imagine Canada as the terrain in which they are the original, and thus the entitled,
envied and vulnerable inhabitants.
The sheer intransigence of "simple logic" and its capacity to withstand its critics are
indicators that it relies on the same kind of racial story of origins to which Dyer refers
and which the CBC documentary illustrates. When we are confronted by the grip that
national mythologies have on ordinary people, Gail Ching-Liang Low suggests, it is
useful to turn to concepts such as fantasy, focusing on the desires revealed in how
individuals imagine their nations. 10 8 Drawing on Kobena Mercer's work on how Black
men are reduced to what white men want to see, a process she calls "a semiotic of
primitivity", Low explores the adventure stories of Victorian England (many of which
were set in Canada). She shows how these tales reveal the English need to contain the
threat of difference posed by Black bodies through repetitive use of stereotype. What,
Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's, 1991).
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then, is revealed in the insistent refrain that "we must know who they are" through
passports and travel documents? Does the notion of Somalis as people who need to
be taught respect and honesty help to convince Canadians that they are indeed
civilized? Iain Chambers describes how national fantasies work when he explores the
hold that the extremely right wing politician Enoch Powell had in Britain and the wide
support he won for his anti-immigration platforms. Powell, who rose to prominence
in the 1970s with images of the English 'race' overwhelmed by hordes of immigrants,
manipulated a limited set of images (Oxford and Cambridge, Queen Victoria and
Churchill, and the storming of Dunkirk) that called to mind a British story of origins,
one of white enterprise and superiority. To be British was to be "spiritually and morally
the 'centre' of the world," a world view that lay at the heart of Powell's contention
that Britain was in danger of losing its hold due to immigration. Critics who contested
his anti-immigration story appeared to be "desecrating the national heritage" and
indeed both sides of the House and the media believed in these powerful images as
much as Powell did. 10 9 In the same way, to contest that Canadians are a generous and
fair-minded people is to "desecrate" the national heritage. A powerful rage and censure
descends on those who would do so, particularly those who ought to be grateful for
being accepted into the country in the first place.
The key contention of "simple logic", that the "original" Canada is imperilled owing
to the arrival of refugees and immigrants (who are coincidentally dark-skinned and
from the South), easily draws upon an older storyline evident in racist thinkers of the
early twentieth century, a process Joseph Bendersky traces in his article "The Disap-
pearance of Blonds: Immigration, Race and the Reemergence of 'Thinking White' ." 110
Informed by a man who was visiting New York that the man's family was told that
they were particularly at risk of theft and assault in New York owing to their blond
hair, Bendersky explores how this storyline of blonds in peril from the alien darker
masses should come to be so easily believed by the tourist, the abundance of secure
blond New Yorkers notwithstanding. He traces the genealogy of this idea in racial
thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century, from prominent American Social Darwin-
ists who worried that white blood would become tainted through miscegenation to
influential scholars who lamented the passing of the great Nordic race. Bendersky
shows how the storyline depends on the idea that the inferior non-white races
"motivated by pure race envy and jealousy" want all the good things that whites have
made for themselves.Il' The racial epic of a higher civilization threatened by a rising
tide of colour has sustained several anti-immigration campaigns throughout the
century. As morally superior "truthtellers" who possess "innate ethical endowment",
whites are naturally besieged by Jews and the darker races, as Edward Ross, a
prominent racial thinker put it in 1914.112 The emotional intensity of the racial epic
109. Chambers, supra note 79 at 147.
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was such that even those who had never seen Jews and immigrants subscribed to it
and politicians were able to count on it when courting electoral support. By the late
1930s, when overt mention of the imperilled Nordic race was no longer socially
acceptable, the racial epic was told as a story of a democratic land overwhelmed by
"a wide influx of people who know nothing about our institutions and care less for
them". 113 Ultimately, in the 1990s, the racial epic came to rely on the figure of the
illegal immigrant, the immoral man intent on taking what was not his, a man whose
culture and morality was the very opposite of the American way of life. 
1 14
Immigration as a story of a sovereign nation forced to protect itself from the unscru-
pulous and envious hordes remains the contemporary racial epic, a feature noted by
scholars working in other contexts as well. Allan Pred, discussing Swedish moves to
tightly control its borders in the 1990s describes the narratives of Swedish politicians
who argue that alien migrant cultures threaten the Swedish way of life. Remarkably
similar to Canadian political talk about testing to see if refugees have learned respect
for the Canadian way of life, Swedish narratives are underpinned by the idea that
Sweden is overwhelmed by immigrants and refugees who know little of Swedish
values and customs and who are not often capable of respecting them. As Swedish
Social Democrat Averker Astrom put it:
It is neither amoral nor against the law to investigate whether he or she (the poten-
tial immigrant or asylum seeker] has a criminal past, maybe as a terrorist; nor to ask
oneself whether the individual in question appears willing or is capable of becom-
ing a loyal member of Swedish society and whether he has what it takes to thrive;
nor to try to judge whether he or she comes from a country or culture whose
customs and usages are so extremely different that a reasonably harmonious adapta-
tion is difficult or impossible ... 115
The position that alien migrants threaten the original way of life relies upon what Pred
calls "a particular geographical imagination", a remembering of Sweden prior to the
arrival of migrants. When racist Swedish youth beat a Somali man in the city of
Goteborg, in an area very much like Dixon, their defence counsel argues that his clients
are not racist: "They only consider Sweden to be packed to the limit.-'116 The social
space is thus re-imagined to support the idea of the threatening immigrant whom we
must control. For the idea of difference as threat to work, Marc Swyngedouw writes
for the Belgian context, a prior idea of an original family of people must be in place.
Thus an idea of racial descent underpins the notion that the hordes are at the gate and
are unlikely to share our values. 117 It underpins as well the notion that we must know
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who they are, a knowledge that does not include knowing about their histories or about
our own complicity in the events that brought them to our borders. Instead, we must
know their essence - whether or not they are like us.
The racial story of identity documents, our insistence on knowing who refugees are
outside of history, derives strong support from the liberal notion of a sovereign state
that has a right to control entry and to maintain a distinction between the rights of
those inside and those outside its borders. The notion of a sovereign state standing outside
of its history is eminently compatible with the narratives of whiteness described by
Dyer. How the state has come to be, the bodies on which it has relied, and the historical
and contemporary relationships that sustain it (for example Northern exploitation of
the South through trade policies), do not typically enter the discussion of rights. 118
Insistently told as an ahistorical and national rather than an international story, liberal
terms of reference make it difficult to consider how it comes to be that there is a flow
of bodies from the South to the North and how the North is itself implicated in the
production of these migrations and refugee flows. 119 For most people, it is difficult to
cut through the rhetoric about tribal warfare in Africa and the "crisis" produced by
37,000 refugees at the door, in order to find the Canadian economic and foreign
policies that directly contribute to the crises in Africa. Arguing that the creation of an
impregnable border only serves to increase the smuggling of immigrants and thus
revenues to crime syndicates, Liz Fekete and Frances Webber put the issue of
complicity baldly:
So long as globalization of markets continues to destroy the livelihoods of Third
World producers, and western arms sales prop up repression, people will try to
escape; and so long as their legal means of escape are blocked, whether by protec-
tionist labour policies or by slamming the doors on refugees, they will be forced to
use dangerous and illegal means. 120
The argument that the acceptance of 37,000 refugees marks a national crisis thrives,
in spite of the knowledge that the Canadian economy depends upon immigration to
survive. Such details sink under the weight of the rhetoric of an entitled, dehistoricized
and autonomous citizenry and sovereign nation. It is sobering to consider French
academic Emmanual Terray's point that the issue of the "undocumented" may well be
the heart of today's political economy. 12 1 Western nations thrive on the unequal
structure of citizenship that is created when some workers have fewer rights than
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others. Indeed, these nations so depend on the labour of the juridically marginalized
and their legally produced vulnerability, that their economies would come to a
standstill without such inequalities.
CONCLUSION
Its economic value notwithstanding, if "simple logic" has thrived it is because it is
able to draw upon a particular racial story of origins, a story about a kind and generous
Northern nation overrun by refugees and immigrants who are simply out to abuse the
country's generosity. Whether or not this story is articulated as openly as it is by the
more Conservative politicians, it remains sufficiently in place and has an underlying
emotional appeal such that the contrasting image of refugees who have specific
histories and who are likely to be genuinely fleeing persecution, cannot take root. Facts
regarding the rarity of fraud, the existence of alternative strategies to identify who
people are, counter-stories about the conditions under which most refugees flee, and
descriptions of the hardships imposed mostly on women and children who must wait
three years for equal citizenship, do not suffice to dislodge "simple logic." Those who
contest it are up against a powerful national mythology, a drama involving reasonable
and civilized white people who only want honesty, and racial Others stubbornly bent
on deceiving them. It is the simplest of storylines, and a very old colonial one. Today,
when the storyline is again deployed to justify an unequal structure of citizenship, we
would do well to remember Jonathan Benthall's point that human rights without
citizen's rights, are extremely limited rights. 122
122. Ibid. at 2.

